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Abstract
This paper establishes a dynamic stochastic partial equilibrium model for ex-
plaining residential investment dynamics in the United States, focusing on the dis-
tinctive cyclical features of residential investment in that it leads the whole economy.
This paper is different from the existing literature in that it adds three new features
to the model: news shocks, collateral constraints and agent heterogeneity. The par-
tial equilibrium analysis where interest rates are exogenously fixed shows that these
assumptions are essential to generating the dynamic pattern in which residential
investment leads consumption and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
JEL classification: E25,E21,E32




For a long time, the housing sector has led the entire economy in business cycles. This
happens not only in the United States but also in other countries, including Japan and
the U.K. Why does the housing sector lead the whole economy? What does its leadership
reveal about the structure of the economy and consumer behavior? This paper proposes
a theoretical model to reflect the way that residential investment leads consumption and
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Housing is an important factor in business cycles. It contributes around 50 percent
of the aggregate wealth per household, according to Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991)
and Bertaut and Starr (2000). The variations in house values generate large wealth
effects on consumer choices regarding consumption and investment. For example, Case,
Quigley, and Shiller (2005) indicate that house prices have a statistically significant and
rather large positive effect on household consumption. Using micro data, Campbell and
Cocco (2007) confirm the significant response of household consumption to house prices.
Similarly, Black, de Meza, and Jeffreys (1996) indicate that a 10 percent increase in house
prices leads to a 5 percent increase in the number of small firms in England because of
the relaxed financial constraints introduced by the rise of collateral values (house prices).
Moreover, residential investment is a good predictor of economic recession. In the past
fifty years, eight of ten recessions (including the most recent one) were preceded by a
severe reduction in residential investment, as reported by Leamer (2007). Therefore, if
we hope to explain and quantify business cycles, we cannot ignore the role played by
the housing sector. Leamer (2007) stresses that the housing sector is very important to
economic recessions, and any attempt to understand business cycle needs to focus on
housing investments in particular.1
1 In Leamer (2007), household investment includes residential investment and consumer durables. The
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One must take two steps to fully understand the effects of the housing sector on the
economy. The first step is to study how consumers choose between consumption and
house purchases during business cycles. The second is to explore how the changes in
house prices generated by consumer choices will affect current investment and, hence,
future output through the credit market. Our paper contributes to this research area by
focusing on the first step only. We study the quantity changes, rather than price changes,
in the housing sector. This strategy not only simplifies our analytical framework, but it
also helps clearly display the mechanism through which consumers adjust their demand
for houses.
The quantity changes in the housing sector (i.e., residential investment) lead GDP,
whereas consumption coincides with GDP. Figure 1 plots detrended data for consump-
tion, residential investment and GDP. Clearly, residential investment is about one or
two quarters ahead of consumption and GDP. Consumption coincides with GDP. Green
(1997) uses the Granger-Causality test to determine that residential investment leads
consumption and GDP significantly, whereas neither consumption nor GDP leads resi-
dential investment. The purpose of our paper is to quantitatively explain this trend. Our
mechanisms and quantitative analysis help us to understand how consumers make choices
between consumption and house purchases in business cycles. We consider it essential to
explore the roles played by the housing sector in business cycles before moving forward.
In this paper, three key assumptions help to explain the dynamics of residential in-
vestment. First, collateralized consumer loans, such as mortgages, are less restricted in
size and carry lower interest rates than do unsecured consumer loans, such as credit card
debt. This assumption is consistent with the data for the U.S. financial market. In 2002,
the 30-year mortgage interest rate in the U.S. was 6.40%, while the average interest rate
data from National Income and Product Accounts(NIPA) shows that residential investment not only
leads gross domestic product more but also has higher volatility than consumer durables.
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Figure 1: Consumption, Residential Investment, and GDP (1959:Q1-2008:Q4)
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for credit card debt was 16.6%.2 This suggests that, even if unsecured consumer loans
are available to everyone, the high cost of borrowing will keep most consumers from using
them as a major financing source. In 2001, 81.5% of consumer loans were collateralized
by residential properties, whereas unsecured consumer loans amounted to only 10%. 3
Secondly, we assume that the agents receive noisy news about future total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP). The news shocks change expectations about the future and hence affect
the consumption and investment choices of consumers. This idea was proposed in the early
literature by researchers such as Pigou (1927), and has begun to recently attract more
attention. People find that contemporaneous shocks to technologies, money, oil prices
and credit can account for only a small part of the variation in output [Cochrane (1994);
Beaudry and Lucke (2009)]. Beaudry and Portier (2006) provide the empirical evidence
that equity prices predict TFP growth in the long term. The shocks to stock prices explain
a substantial fraction of the output fluctuations. This gives support to the idea of news
shocks as an important resource for business cycles. However, in the neoclassical growth
models, news shocks cannot generate booms or even co-movement between employment,
consumption, investment and output [for instance, Cochrane (1994); Beaudry and Portier
(2004); Beaudry and Portier (2007)]. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) propose a theoretical
model within this framework and solves these problems by introducing three elements:
variable capital utilization, adjustment costs to investment and a weak short-run effect
of wealth on the labor supply. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008) and Khan and Tsoukalas
(2009) perform Bayesian estimations of this theoretical model and further confirm that
anticipated shocks explain more than half of the predicted aggregate fluctuations. Our
paper contributes to this body of literature by applying this assumption to the model of
2 The data on the mortgage rate is taken from International Monetary Fund (2002). The data on the
credit card rate is taken from Gross and Souleles (2002).
3 The education loans constitute about 50 percent of the unsecured loans. These statistics are taken from
Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and Moore (2003) computing these numbers with the data of Survey of Consumer
Finance (SCF, 2001).
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heterogeneous agents and housing sectors. In this way, we can explore how consumers at
different wealth levels consume and make house purchases when the same news shocks
affect their expectations about the future.
Thirdly, we use the perpetual model proposed by Blanchard (1985) to explore the
effects of income and news shocks on consumer choices regarding house purchases. In
this model, young agents are born with an inheritance left to them by the old who have
just passed away. They receive endowments during each period and determine their
consumption and house purchases. They derive less utility from houses when they become
old than when they are young. Hence, consumers are heterogeneous in terms of income,
accumulated wealth and preferences regarding houses. This setup helps us to examine
and quantify how wealth accumulation and life cycles are related to house purchases.
Through numerical experiments, we find that collateral constraints and news shocks
are both essential to generating the leadership of the housing sector over business cy-
cles. Once they have been hit by the news shocks, the agents change their expectations
about their future income and hence think differently about current house purchases and
consumption. Financial constraints then restrain agent choices because the news shocks
about income changes take some time to become reality, and, in the meantime, current
incomes remain the same. During this process, wealth heterogeneity plays an important
role in the mechanism through which the collateral constraints amplify the response of
house purchases to news shocks. Consumers at heterogeneous wealth levels adopt dif-
ferent policies in response to the news shocks: the degree to which they adjust both
consumption and housing purchases decreases with wealth levels. In particular, agents
with a low wealth level adjust their housing purchases more than their consumption be-
cause of collateral constraints. Furthermore, agents accumulate wealth but demand fewer
houses as they age. This guarantees that most house purchases are made by collaterally
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constrained agents who are mostly young and who have a small amount of wealth at their
disposal. Hence, the collateral constraints and the news shocks interact with the agent
heterogeneity in generating the housing sector’s leadership of the economy. Through this
mechanism, news shocks can generate much deeper effects on aggregate volatility when
combined with financial constraints than without them. This point is not given sufficient
attention in the current literature on news shocks. Moreover, wealth heterogeneity also
affects the business cycles containing news shocks even when all agents have the same
information about the future, and this consideration has not been studied yet.
Our paper also contributes to the large body of literature about economies composed
of heterogeneous agents that involve aggregate uncertainty. Some studies focus on the
interaction between the collateral constraints, the housing sectors and aggregate dynamics.
For example, Iacoviello (2005) sets up a monetary business cycle model with heterogeneous
agents, savers (patient workers) and borrowers (impatient entrepreneurs), with collateral
constraints tied to house values. Hercowitz and Campbell (2005) use a similar borrower-
saver model and finds that the reduced collateral constraints can explain the decline in
aggregate volatility since the 1980s. In terms of the details of our model, our study is
more similar to the work of Silos (2007), Kiyotaki, Michaelides, and Nikolov (2007) and
Fisher and Gervais (2007). These authors develop and quantify a life cycle model of
consumption and house purchases under the assumption of aggregate income shocks. Our
paper contributes to this literature by providing an analysis of the effects of the news
shocks on the agents’ behavior, expanding the available financial tools from mortgages
alone to both mortgages and credit cards, exploring how wealth affects purchase polices
under expectation shocks, and quantitatively showing that residential investment leads
the economy.
Our paper is also related to the body of literature that studies neoclassical growth
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models for housing sectors. These studies seek to match the co-movements between con-
sumption, business investment, residential investment and output. They include papers
by Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991), Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright (1991), Gomme,
Kydland, and Rupert (2001), Davis and Heathcote (2005), Fisher (2007) and Gomme
and Rupert (2007). The common features of these papers are that they propose dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models of homogeneous agents and that they consider con-
temporaneous shocks. Gomme and Rupert (2007) are the most recent contributors to this
body of literature and proposes carefully calibrated two-sector models. They find that
the stochastic growth models of contemporaneous shocks fail to indicate the leadership of
residential investment over GDP and consumption.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we provide the detailed setup
of the model and define the equilibrium. In section 3, we calibrate and parameterize
the model. Section 4 displays the numerical results from the experiments and compare
different models in order to highlight the importance of the key assumptions made in our
model. Section 5 concludes this paper, and discusses some directions of future research.
2 Model
2.1 Agents
The economy consists of a continuum of agents maximizing their expected lifetime utility.
Constant population of new generation of the agents are born in each period while the
same size of population die. Each new-born agent receives identical heritage from the
passed away. The agents live for N ages and have different income levels at different ages
of their lives. We use i to denote the age of life, where i ∈ N = {1, 2, 3, , ...N}. For any
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where β ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor; cjt ≥ 0 is the consumption for agent j at time t;
i0 = i and h
j
t ≥ 0 is the self-owned house. The period utility satisfies the following CES
form
U(c, h, i) = (1− κih)
c(1−θ) − 1





where κih ∈ [0, 1) describes the agent’s preferences for the houses and κih decreases with
i. We make this assumption to catch the realistic differences between the young and the
old in their demand for the houses. The young people need houses to build the families.
And the old people derive less utility from the houses than the young because the family
size shrinks with their ages. 4
At each period, the agent receives an endowment consisting of two parts: individual





t+1 ≤ ajt + hjt−1(1− δh) + χ(hjt , hjt−1) + εjit,tzt + I(ajt , hjt−1),
where ajt is the financial asset; h
j
t−1 is the house value held in the previous period; δh is the
depreciation rate of housing capital; χ denotes the adjustment costs for the houses; εjit,t is
4 It is the service flow of the housing capital that contributes to the personal utility. However, given
the two assumptions of Cob-Douglas home production and CES utility function, we can transform the
utility function into the above form. For example, suppose that the utility function satisfies
U(c, ch, i) = (1− κih)
c(1−θ) − 1







where ch is the service flow from the housing capital. Assume that service flow ch produced by the
house h satisfies Cob-Douglas form: ch = hαh where αh is the parameter of the production function.
Then by putting this home production function back into the above equation, we can obtain the CES
utility function alike and the risk aversion for housing satisfies θh = 1− (1− θ)αh.
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the t-period individual income of the agent j at age it; zt is the aggregate income shock;
and I denotes the return from the liquid wealth (financial asset and housing capital). If
ajt < 0, the agent j borrows a
j
t amount of consumer debts; if a
j
t > 0, the agent j saves a
j
t








0 if hjt = h
j
t−1
−φhjt−1 if hjt 6= hjt−1
,
which means that if the house value changes, the agent has to pay some constant percent-
age of the original house value as the adjustment costs. This assumption captures the
feature that people spend more time or money to sell expensive houses than the cheap
ones.
The individual income of the agent j, εji,t, depends on his/her age i. We derive our
analytical framework from the perpetual-youth model proposed by Blanchard (1985). At
each period, the agent stays at the current age or moves to the next age profile with
some possibility until death. We denote the transition matrix of age as Pn. We assume
that the agents of the economy do not care about the welfare of their heirs, i.e. no
intergenerational altruism. Besides the age profile of the income, the agent also has the
idiosyncratic income shocks which are subject to AR(1) process. We denote the log value
of the individual income as ejit,t = log(ε
j
it,t
). ejit,t satisfies the following








υjt ∼ i.i.d. N(0, σ2υ),
where ζ denotes the growth rate of income over age (or you can also understand it as
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experiences); it denotes the age of the agent j at t period; ξ
j
t denotes the idiosyncratic
income; and υjt denotes the innovation to the process of the idiosyncratic income with
variance σ2υ. Under this assumption of income process, all the agents have the same
income growth rates over ages. Besides that, they also have persistent idiosyncratic
income shocks. This income process is widely applied in the research of macroeconomics
about life-cycle consumption.
In order to make the computation feasible, we need to discretize the process of id-
iosyncratic income shocks and approximate the conditional expectation by the finite set
of its values at each element of the state space. We use the method proposed by Rouwen-
horst (1995) to discretize the process of idiosyncratic income shocks ξ. This method has
the advantage of keeping the variance and the autocorrelation of the discretized process
consistent with the original process. After discretization, we denote the set of finite states
as Ξ and the transition probability as Pξ.
The aggregate productivity shock zt and the individual income ε
j
i,t are two Markov
processes, independent with each other. Section 2.3 provides the details about the process
of the aggregate productivity z.
2.2 Market Arrangement
There are two forms of consumer debts available in the financial market. The first form of
consumer debt is mortgage, of which the interest rate is denoted by r. But the mortgages
need to be collateralized by the house values. We use γ to denote the percentage of the
house values agents can use as the collateral. It implies that the agents can only borrow
up to γ ∈ [0, 1) percent of their house values through the mortgages. The second form is
credit card debt, for which the agents need to pay a very high interest rate rc À r. We
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denote h as the value of the houses. Then, the debts smaller than γh are charged with
the interest rate r and the debts exceeding γh are charged with credit card rates. The
interest rates r and rc are exogenously given and fixed over time.
Given the above arrangements of financial markets, the capital return I in the budget
constraint is given by







−rγhjt−1 + (ajt + γhjt−1)rc if ajt < −γhjt−1.
If the consumer does not borrow more than γhjt−1, he/she pays or receives the interest
rates r. If the consumer borrows more than the value of collateral γhjt−1, he/she has
to pay for two levels of interest rate costs. For the part of secured consumer debts (or
financial assets) −γht−1, the agent pays (or receives) a low interest rate r. For the part
of unsecured loans ajt + γh
j
t−1, the agent pays a high interest rate r
c. We assume that
the interest rates r and rc are fixed over time and make the quantitative analysis under
the framework of partial equilibrium. This set up reduces the costs of computation a lot
without hurting the fulfillment of the purpose of our paper.
2.3 News Structure
At period t, the agents receive the signal st about zt+1. zt+1 contains the information of
aggregate income shocks at period t + 1.
We denote zt as the current productivity, zt+1 as the future productivity and st as the
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current signal. zt, zt+1 and st satisfy the following conditions:
zt+1 = ρzt + νt+1
st = ρzt + ηt.
The disturbances (νt+1, ηt) are i.i.d processes and satisfy the following conditions:
(νt+1, ηt) ⊥ zt
(νt+1, ηt) ∼ N(0, Π),








σν denotes the standard deviation of the disturbances. π denotes the correlation coefficient
of ηt and νt+1. π describes the accuracy of the signal. If π = 1, the disturbance ηt of
the signal is highly correlated with the disturbance νt+1 of the future productivity. The
signal contains full information about the future productivity. If π = 0, ηt is uncorrelated
with νt+1. The signal contains no more information than the current productivity does.
Therefore, the higher π is, the more information the signal contains about the future
productivity.
We make this assumption about the news structure for the following two reasons.
Firstly, although a large literature displays and stresses the forecasting powers of several
kinds of signals, it is still far from reaching the agreement on which one should be the best
one. Therefore, we do not have any empirical literature estimating the parameter about
the accuracy of the news. Secondly, the purpose of our paper is to show the mechanism
through which the news affects the choices of the consumers. Hence, this setup is easy
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for us to display and compare the numerical results of different levels of π.
In order to make the computation feasible, we need to discretize the states of the above
two stochastic processes. We do so by extending the method proposed by Tauchen (1986)
from one dimension to two dimensions. Appendix A.2 describes in details the method of
discretization used in this paper. After discretization, we denote Z as the set of aggregate
income shocks. The set of signal states is denoted by S and satisfies S = Z. We denote
the transition matrix between (z, s) to (z′, s′) as Θ.
2.4 Definition of Recursive Partial Equilibrium
Given the interest rates (r, rc), the recursive partial equilibrium is composed of state
space, value function, policy functions, and distribution function. The state space is as
encompassing housing capital h ∈ H, the wealth w ∈ W , the present idiosyncratic income
shock ε, the aggregate income shock z, and the signal s for z′.
We denote i as the age of an agent and ξ as the state of his/her idiosyncratic income.
His/Her value function V satisfies the following conditions. If i < N , then
V(h, w, i, ξ, z, s) = max
{c,h′,a′}
{









−φh if h′ 6= h







a′ + h′ 1−δh
1+r




− γh′ + h′ 1−δh
1+r
if a′ < −γh′
(4)
w′r ≥ −Bi. (5)
If i = N , the agent retires and his/her value function is defined by
Vo(h,w, z, s) = max{c,h′,a′}
{




c + h′ + a′ ≤ w(1 + r) + χ(h′, h) + εoz
w′r ≥ −Bo,
where w′ is updated as described by equation (4).
Equation (2) defines the budget constraint. Equation (3) defines the costs of house
adjustment. Equation (4) defines the wealth of the next period w′. Equation (5) guar-
antees that the agents can pay the interest rates of their debts even if they have the
lowest income in the next period. This means that the agents cannot borrow more than
the amount that their lowest possible wage income can support, based on the cost of the
interest rates associated with the consumer loans. A large literature has applied the same
assumption in the models of the heterogeneous agent, for example, Aiyagari (1994). The
choice variables are the consumption c, the current house h′, and the future financial asset
a′. Therefore, the policy functions can be denoted as the following: the current consump-
tion c = gc(h,w, i, ξ, z, s); the current house h
′ = gh(h,w, i, ξ, z, s); and the future wealth
w′ = gw(h,w, i, ξ, z, s).
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λ denotes the distribution of all agents over the state variables (h,w, i, ξ), which is
updated each period. Given the states of the next period (h′, w′, i′, ξ′), if the set B is
defined as
B = {(h,w, i, ξ) ∈ H ×W ×N × Ξ|h′ = gh(h,w, i, ξ, z, s), w′ = gw(h,w, i, ξ, z, s)},
the updated distribution function satisfies




3 Calibration and Parametrization
In this model, the set of parameters includes preferences {N , (κih)Ni=1, θ, θh, β}, market
{r, rh, δh, γ, φ, (Bi)Ni=1}, and productivity {ζ,Pn, %, σ2υ, π, ρ, σν}. Table 1 displays the pa-
rameters used in the simulations. We will explain how to determine the values of these
parameters in this section.
Because first-time home buyers are around the age of 30, we set the life cycle at 35.
In addition, we set the number of life stages as N = 4, with i = 1 corresponding to
36 ∼ 45, i = 2 to 46 ∼ 55, i = 3 to 56 ∼ 65 and i = 4 to 65 and plus. We assume
that κih = κ
j
h = κh (if i, j < 4), i.e. the agents younger than 65 years old have the same
preferences. For the agents older than 65, we set κ4h = 0 which means that older people
do not receive any utility from their houses. Given that the houses can depreciate over
time in the model, this assumption guarantees that the older people hold financial assets
but not houses. We calibrate κh to match the mean of the ratios of residential investment
to personal domestic consumption in the U.S. data (1965-2007).
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The after-tax yearly mortgage rate is 4.8%. Under the U.S. tax system, mortgage
payments can be taken as income tax deductions. With the capital tax rate set at 29.2%,
this means that the mortgage rate before tax is 6.7%. We use the value of the capital
tax rate from Gomme and Rupert (2007). The after-tax credit card rate is set at 12.1%,
which implies that the credit card rate before tax is 17.1%. The depreciation rates of the
houses δh are chosen as the mean of the ratios of residential investment to the aggregate
value of houses (1965-2007). γ is calibrated such that the ratio of aggregate house value
over GDP is consistent with the mean of the data. Because φ measures the adjustment
costs of houses, its value affects how often the agents move. We calibrate φ to match the
volatility of the residential investment.
The parameter ζ measures the growth rate of income over age. We set ζ at 0.6,
which implies that agents’ income increases by 60% within ten years. For the AR(1)
process for the idiosyncratic income shocks ξ, we choose the autocorrelation coefficient %
as 0.98 and συ as 0.015. The group i = 4 corresponds to those individuals more than 65
years old. We assume that they retire and receive 50% of their average former income as
their pension. Appendix A.3 lists the parameters of the stochastic process for individual
income. Because the older people have a lower effective discount factor (because of the
probability of death), they may choose to reach the lower bound of borrowing because
of the relative low risk associated with aggregate volatility. Hence, we set B4 = 0 to
avoid implying that the older people might leave a negative amount of wealth to their
descendants after death. The aggregate income process z follows the process for the HP
filtered real GDP from NIPA (1959:I to 2008:IV). Please refer to Appendix A.3 for the




β = 0.985 discount factor
κh = 0.261 the weight of housing in utility function
θ = 1 risk aversion for consumption
θh = 1 risk aversion for self-owned housing
Market
r = 4.80% mortgage rate
rc = 12.30% credit card rate
δh = 0.015 depreciation rate of the houses
γ = 0.820 1− γ: down payment
φ = 0.081 adjustment costs
{Bi}Ni=1 = {0.035, 0.056, 0.09, 0.00} borrowing constraints
Productivity
ζ = 0.6 income growth rate over ages
% = 0.98 autocorrelation of idiosyncratic income process
σ2υ = 0.015 the variance of innovation to idiosyncratic shocks
ρ = 0.82 autocorrelation of aggregate income process
σν = 0.017 standard deviation of innovation to aggregate income process
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4 Numerical Results
We compute and compare three economies. In Benchmark economy, the agents have access
to mortgages and credit cards. They also receive news about next-period productivity
with the correlation of the two disturbances π equal to 0.8. The agents in Economy I
face the same financial market structures. However, we set π = 0.2, which means that
the news is much less informative in this economy than in Economy I. In Economy II,
γ = 0 and π = 0.8, which implies that the agents face the same borrowing constraints
for both housing purchases and consumption. Table 2 displays the second moments
which are computed with the data simulated using the three models. Table 3 displays
the results of Granger Causality test with the real data and the simulated data. In
Benchmark Economy, the correlation coefficients of residential investment with GDP reach
the highest point at xt−1, implying that residential investment is most closely correlated
with future GDP. The Granger-Causality test shows that residential investment Granger-
causes consumption and output, whereas neither consumption nor output Granger-causes
residential investment. The correlation coefficients of consumption and GDP reach the
highest point at xt, whereas a Granger-Causality test shows that consumption has no
Granger-causality relationship with GDP. The Granger-Causality test confirms that the
Benchmark Economy displays the same pattern of lead-lag relationship as the real data.
In both Economy I and Economy II, residential investment has the highest correlation
coefficient with the current GDP. The Granger-causality test also confirms that residential
investment does not granger-cause consumption or GDP. These simulation results display
that the two assumptions of news shocks and mortgage are both necessary to generate
the leadership of residential investment over the whole economy.
A simple example can be used to illustrate the main mechanism at work in this pa-
per. An agent receives good news about future productivity shocks and wants to increase
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Table 2: Second Moments of Data and Simulated Results
Variable x Standard Correlation coefficients of GDPt with
deviation xt−4 xt−3 xt−2 xt−1 xt xt+1 xt+2 xt+3 xt+4
Data
GDP 0.02 0.19 0.38 0.62 0.82 1.00 0.82 0.62 0.38 0.17
Consumption 0.01 0.19 0.38 0.60 0.78 0.88 0.80 0.65 0.46 0.26
Residential Investment 0.10 0.38 0.54 0.68 0.80 0.77 0.63 0.44 0.24 0.05
Benchmark Economy: γ = 0.82 and π = 0.8
GDP 0.02 -0.03 0.39 0.61 0.81 1.00 0.81 0.61 0.39 0.17
Consumption 0.01 0.06 0.27 0.51 0.74 0.94 0.93 0.80 0.61 0.40
Residential Investment 0.16 0.39 0.49 0.55 0.54 0.21 -0.05 -0.20 -0.25 -0.29
Economy I: γ = 0.82 and π = 0.2
GDP 0.02 -0.03 0.39 0.61 0.81 1.00 0.81 0.61 0.39 0.17
Consumption 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.29 0.49 0.88 0.73 0.68 0.60 0.55
Residential Investment 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.32 0.37 0.53 -0.12 -0.15 -0.21 -0.12
Economy II: γ = 0.0 and π = 0.8
GDP 0.02 0.17 0.39 0.61 0.81 1.00 0.81 0.61 0.39 0.17
Consumption 0.01 0.06 0.29 0.53 0.77 0.92 0.90 0.78 0.62 0.43
Residential Investment 0.10 0.35 0.52 0.69 0.78 0.84 0.69 0.51 0.31 0.09
This table displays the statistic properties of the real data and the simulated data. The first panel
is the real data, and the other three panels are the simulated data sets, which are obtained by
choosing different parameters in the model. Note that GDP in each model is given exogenously
and consist with the real data.
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Table 3: Granger Causality Test
Data
GDP Consumption Residential Investment
GDP / N Y
Consumption N / Y
Residential Investment N N /
Benchmark Economy: γ = 0.82 and π = 0.8
GDP Consumption Residential Investment
GDP / N Y
Consumption N / Y
Residential Investment N N /
Economy I: γ = 0.82 and π = 0.2
GDP Consumption Residential Investment
GDP / N N
Consumption Y / N
Residential Investment Y Y /
Economy II: γ = 0.0 and π = 0.8
GDP Consumption Residential Investment
GDP / Y N
Consumption N / N
Residential Investment N N /
We test the Granger-Causality for the real data and the simulated data. Following Green (1997),
we choose six lags for each variable in the regression and the significant level at 1%. ‘Y’ denotes
that the variable in the corresponding column Granger-causes the variable in the corresponding
row; and ‘N’ denotes that the variable in the corresponding column does NOT Granger-cause
the variable in the corresponding row.
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current purchases, including housing purchases, to intertemporally smooth his/her con-
sumption. Because his/her current income does not increase, he/she must use his/her
savings to finance the increased expenditures. He/she is able to borrow at a low rate of
interest for most housing purchases, and this is not possible for purchases of other types
of consumption. As a result, the agent will spend more on housing than on other goods.
In other words, the accessibility of credit through mortgages makes residential investment
respond more quickly to the signals of future TFP shocks. This explains why residential
investment leads consumption and GDP. If the signal turns out to be accurate, the agent
will achieve a higher income and become less financially constrained than he/she is today.
At this time, he/she will be able to increase his/her consumption of other goods, which
explains why consumption tends to coincide with GDP.
To highlight the mechanism at work in Economy I, it is also worthwhile to review
the agents’ policy functions at various wealth levels. We use the percentage difference
between policy functions when the signals shift from bad to good ∆gh(w){i,ξ,z,sb,sg} and
∆gc(w){i,ξ,z,sb,sg} to attain this objective. ∆gh denotes the percentage difference in the
policy of house purchases. ∆gh is defined by
∆gh(w){i,ξ,z,sb,sg} =
gh(h̄, w, i, ξ, z, sg)− gh(h̄, w, i, ξ, z, sb)
gh(h̄, w, i, ξ, z, sb)
,
where h̄ is chosen to be the mean of the house holdings in the economy; w denotes
the individual wealth; and sb < z < sg means that the signals shift from bad to good.
Similarly, ∆gc(w){i,ξ,z,sb,sg} denotes the percentage difference of the consumption policy
when the signals shift from bad to good, and satisfies
∆gc(w){i,ξ,z,sb,sg} =
gc(h̄, w, i, ξ, z, sg)− gc(h̄, w, ε, z, sb)
gc(h̄, w, i, ξ, z, sb)
.
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Figure 2 depicts the two functional curves of ∆gh(w){i,ξ,z,s1,s2} and ∆gc(w){i,ξ,z,s1,s2} over
w. In this figure, we choose (i, ξ, z) to be the middle values in their respective ranges.
Based on Figure 2, three observations can be made. First, the percentage adjustments
in the areas of housing and consumption decrease with wealth. This indicates that the
income effect of the good signals matters more for poor agents than it does for rich agents
because the expected lifetime income of the poor increases more based on good signals.
For more affluent individuals, liquid wealth, like housing and financial assets, constitutes
the majority of their lifetime income. Hence, lifetime income does not change much
based on the news shocks, and neither do purchases. Secondly, as can be seen from the
right-hand side of the black dotted line, for rich people who are not limited by financial
constraints, the percentage adjustment in consumption is roughly equal to the change in
housing expenditure. This trend is consistent with the log utility function, which displays
unity income elasticity. Finally, as seen on the left-hand side of the black dotted line,
poor agents make much larger adjustments in housing capital than in consumption in
the event of good news. This pattern is consistent with the idea that mortgages allow
more rapid adjustments in housing purchases in response to information shocks than are
possible for consumption. In summary, in the benchmark economy, poor people make the
largest adjustments in response to good signals. These people are financially constrained
and consequently adjust their residential investments more than they adjust their con-
sumption. Because poor people constitute the majority of the population, adjustments
to housing expenditure (residential investment) lead the economy.
In Economy I, which lacks news about the future TFP, the agents can only adjust
consumption and residential investment simultaneously after observing the current aggre-
gate shocks. Hence, both consumption and the residential investment reach their highest
point at T = 0, which means that they both coincide with GDP. The Granger-Causality
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Figure 2: ∆gh vs. ∆gc
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test also reveals that the residential investment does not Granger-cause consumption or
the output. Because the agents can borrow against the value of their houses, they can
adjust their house purchase levels more than is possible for consumption. Therefore, after
T = 0, the correlation coefficients decline so much that they even reach a negative value.
This indicates that the agents change their residential investment levels after observing
current aggregate shocks, so much so that they can even make reverse adjustments later.
In Economy II, although the agents receive signals about future productivity, their
financial constraints keep them from quickly responding to information shocks. Those
who are experiencing financial constraints must wait to make adjustments until the next
period, when they will have the higher income realized. Therefore, residential investment
shares certain cyclical features with consumption. The highest correlation coefficients in
both cases are with current GDP. Granger-Causality tests also confirm that residential
investment does not Granger-cause consumption or output. It is interesting to compare
this result with the one that we achieve in analyzing Economy I. In this economy, the
lack of access to mortgages makes residential investment behave like consumption in its
dynamic features; i.e., it acts as though agents do not receive any informative news.
Comparison of the numerical results of the three models leads us to conclude that only
Benchmark Economy indicates that residential investment leads consumption, and that
consumption coincides with GDP. This suggests that the two assumptions of news shocks
and collateral constraints are crucial in generating the cyclical features of residential
investment consistent with the U.S. data.
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5 Conclusion
This paper establishes a dynamic stochastic partial equilibrium model that can be used to
explain residential investment dynamics in the United States, focusing on the distinctive
cyclical features of residential investment that it leads the entire economy. This paper
departs from the existing literature in adding three new features to the model that help to
generate the dynamics of residential investment in accordance with the data. These three
distinctive assumptions are news shocks, collateral constraints and agent heterogeneity.
The partial equilibrium analysis in which interest rates are exogenously fixed shows that
the assumptions of news shocks and collateral constraints are essential to the generation
of the conditions under which residential investment leads consumption and GDP. The
key mechanism for these results is that in response to good information, agents purchase
houses more than other goods because they are bound by collateral constraints.
We can definitely achieve more significant results by expanding this model from a
partial equilibrium model to a general equilibrium model. By introducing the production
sector into the model, we could explore how the economy shapes residential investment
and business investment over time. In particular, business investment has a special feature
in that it lags behind the whole economy. What does this fact reveal about agent choices
regarding consumption, residential investment and business investment? Furthermore,
how does this choice affect aggregate dynamics of the economy such like volatility and
even social welfare? These questions should be addressed by future research.
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This section describes the data with which the second moments are computed. The
quarter data are from NIPA, including consumption, residential investment, output from
1959:I to 2008: IV. The consumption is composed of non-durable goods, durable goods
and services. We subtract the imputed rents of self-owned houses from the consumption.
The residential investment includes the costs of building new houses and renovating the
old ones. The output consists of the consumption and the residential investment. Because
the model we use is an endowment economy, we do not consider the business investment.
Hence, we exclude the business investment from the subjects of research and similarly
government expenditure. All the data are real and detrended with the Hodrick-Prescott
filter.
A.2 Discretizing Two-Dimensional AR(1) Process
We extend the application of the method proposed by Tauchen (1986) from one-dimensional
AR(1) process into the following two-dimensional AR(1) process defined by the following
z′ = ρz + ν,
s = ρz + η,
where z is the current productivity, s is the current signal and z′ denotes the next-
period productivity. The disturbances (ν, η) are i.i.d processes and satisfy the following
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conditions:
(ν, η) ⊥ z
(ν, η) ∼ N(0, Π),








Following Tauchen (1986), we assume the members of Z evenly-spaced and denoted
as Z = {z1, z2, . . . , zn−1, zn} which satisfies
z1 < z2 < · · · < zn.
The upper and the lower bounds on the range, z1 and zn, respectively, are set to m
unconditional standard deviations on each side of 0.5 Therefore, z1 and zn satisfy the
following






We also assume the signals s ∈ S = Z. If we define the state composed of the current
productivity and the signal, i.e. (z, s), the probability transition matrix is determined as
follows.
Let ω = zi − zi−1 (i > 1). Given (z, s), the probability of z′ satisfies the following.
5 0 is the unconditional mean of z in this paper.
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If 1 < i < n,
Prob(z′ = zi|z = zm, s = zh) =
Prob(zi − ω/2 ≤ ρzm + ν ≤ zi + ω/2|η = zh − ρzm) =
Φ
[












If i = 1,
Prob(z′ = zi|z = zm, s = zh) =
Prob(ρzm + ν ≤ z1 + ω/2|η = zh − ρzm) =
Φ
[





If i = n,
Prob(z′ = zi|z = zm, s = zh) =
Prob(ρzm + ν ≥ zn − ω/2|η = zh − ρzm) =
1− Φ
[





where Φ(·) denotes the cumulated distribution function of standard normal distribution.
Also, we know that given z′, the probability of s′ satisfies the following
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If 1 < j < n,
P(s′ = zj|z′ = zi) =
P(zj − ω/2 ≤ ρzi + η ≤ zj + ω/2) =
Φ
[





zj − ω/2− ρzi
σ
]
If j = 1,
P(s′ = z1|z′ = zi) =
P(ρzi + η ≤ z1 + ω/2) =
Φ
[
z1 + ω/2− ρzi
σ
]
If j = n,
P(z′ = zn|z′ = zi) =
P(ρzi + ν ≥ zn − ω/2) =
1− Φ
[
zn − ω/2− ρzi
σ
]
Then the transition probability is defined by
Prob(z′, s′|z, s) = Prob(z′|z, s)Prob(s′|z′).
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A.3 Parameters of Income Process
This appendix displays the parameters of the processes of the individual income. The set
of states for the individual income process (normalized to 1) is given by
(
0.0352 0.1477 0.0563 0.2363 0.0900 0.3781 0.0564
)
.
And the transition matrix Ω is given by


0.8335 0.0084 0.1565 0.0016 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0084 0.8335 0.0016 0.1565 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.8335 0.0084 0.1565 0.0016 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0084 0.8335 0.0016 0.1565 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8335 0.0084 0.1581
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0084 0.8335 0.1581




The state of 1 corresponds to n = 1 of the age and the low state of idiosyncratic
income. The state of 2 corresponds to n = 1 of the age and the high state of idiosyncratic
income. And so on so forth until the state 7. The state 7 corresponds to the state of
retirement.
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